(This is something I got off the Internet which may be of interest).
Is the fracking boom set to go spectacularly bust?
Those great folks at DeSmogBlog have highlighted how two reports were published yesterday, which stick a huge pin in the hype surrounding the shale gas bubble.
Rather than putting us on the road to energy security, the reports basically argue that the fracking boom could burst just as the US housing market imploded in the late noughties.
Both reports were published on the ShaleBubble.org website, which is a great new interactive website from the Post Carbon Institute, Energy Policy Forum, and Earthworks.
The aim of the website is to provide critical analysis — using industry and government data — to counter the false claims that domestic supplies of shale gas and shale oil (tight oil) will ensure energy security and significant long-term economic benefits to the US.
In the first report J. David Hughes from the Post Carbon Institute has written a painstakingly researched report, called “Drill Baby, Drill”, which looks at the prospects for various unconventional fuels to provide energy abundance for the United States in the 21st Century.
It will make uncomfortable reading for politicians and the pro-oil hawks. The report concludes that the U.S. cannot drill and frack its way to energy independence. “Despite the rhetoric, the United States is highly unlikely to become energy independent unless rates of energy consumption are radically reduced.”
Indeed the “much-heralded reduction of oil imports in the past few years has in fact been just as much a story of reduced consumption, primarily related to the Great Recession, as it has been a story of increased production.”
The report argues that “At best, shale gas, tight oil, tar sands, and other unconventional resources provide a temporary reprieve from having to deal with the real problems: fossil fuels are finite, and production of new fossil fuel resources tends to be increasingly expensive and environmentally damaging.”
Although shale gas production has grown explosively to account for nearly 40 percent of U.S. natural gas production; its production has been on a plateau since December 2011. A whopping 80 percent of shale gas production comes from just five plays, several of which are already in decline.
Shale gas is ridiculously expensive: some $42 billion per year is spent to drill more than 7,000 wells, just in order to maintain production.
Tight oil, meanwhile does not fare much better and is a bubble of “ten years duration”. Once again, tight oil plays “are characterized by high decline rates, and it is estimated that more than 6,000 wells (at a cost of $35 billion annually) are required to maintain production”.
So that’s nearly $80 billion just to stand still.
Hughes concludes that “the projections by pundits and some government agencies that these technologies can provide endless growth heralding a new era of ‘energy independence,’ in which the U.S. will become a substantial net exporter of energy, are entirely unwarranted based on the fundamentals.”
The second report is written by a former Wall Street financier, Deborah Rogers, who examines the role of the banks in the shale gas bubble.
She argues that “Wall Street promoted the shale gas drilling frenzy, which resulted in prices lower than the cost of production and thereby profited [enormously] from mergers & acquisitions and other transactional fees.”
Such has been the frenzy that U.S. shale gas and shale oil reserves have been overestimated by a minimum of 100% and by as much as a massive 400-500% by operators. The reality is that “Shale oil wells are following the same steep decline rates and poor recovery efficiency observed in shale gas wells.”
The reason that the price of natural gas has been driven down is largely due to severe overproduction in meeting financial analysts’ targets of production growth for share appreciation.
She concludes that “Unconventional oil and gas from shales has been claimed to be a game changer, revolutionary,“a gift and national treasure,” however “shale development is not about long-term economic promise for a region, nor is it about job creation or long term financial viability of shale wells”, its all about a quick financial win for the bankers.
“Leases were bundled and flipped on unproved shale fields in much the same way as mortgage-backed securities had been bundled and sold on questionable underlying mortgage assets prior to the economic downturn of 2007,” she warns.
Just as the banks went boom to bust, these reports are a stark warning about what could happen with the fracking boom.
Don’t say you weren’t warned.
A new study of ocean warming has just been published in Geophysical Research
Letters by Balmaseda, Trenberth, and Källén (2013). There are several important
conclusions which can be drawn from this paper.
•Completely contrary to the popular contrarian myth, global warming has
accelerated, with more overall global warming in the past 15 years than the
prior 15 years. This is because about 90% of overall global warming goes into
heating the oceans, and the oceans have been warming dramatically.
•As suspected, much of the ‘missing heat’ Kevin Trenberth previously talked
about has been found in the deep oceans. Consistent with the results of
Nuccitelli et al. (2012), this study finds that 30% of the ocean warming over
the past decade has occurred in the deeper oceans below 700 meters, which they
note is unprecedented over at least the past half century.
•Some recent studies have concluded based on the slowed global surface warming
over the past decade that the sensitivity of the climate to the increased
greenhouse effect is somewhat lower than the IPCC best estimate. Those studies
are fundamentally flawed because they do not account for the warming of the deep
•The slowed surface air warming over the past decade has lulled many people into
a false and unwarranted sense of security.
The main results of the study are illustrated in its Figure 1.
Figure 1: Ocean Heat Content from 0 to 300 meters (grey), 700 m (blue), and
total depth (violet) from ORAS4, as represented by its 5 ensemble members. The
time series show monthly anomalies smoothed with a 12-month running mean, with
respect to the 1958–1965 base period. Hatching extends over the range of the
ensemble members and hence the spread gives a measure of the uncertainty as
represented by ORAS4 (which does not cover all sources of uncertainty). The
vertical colored bars indicate a two year interval following the volcanic
eruptions with a 6 month lead (owing to the 12-month running mean), and the
1997–98 El Niño event again with 6 months on either side. On lower right, the
linear slope for a set of global heating rates (W/m2) is given.
In this paper, the authors used ocean heat content data from the European Centre
for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts’ Ocean Reanalysis System 4 (ORAS4). A
`reanalysis’ is a climate or weather model simulation of the past that
incorporates data from historical observations. In the case of ORAS4, this
includes ocean temperature measurements from bathythermographs and the Argo
buoys, and other types of data like sea level and surface temperatures. The
ORAS4 data span from 1958 to the present, and have a high 1°x1° horizontal
resolution, as well as 42 vertical layers. As the authors describe the data
“ORAS4 has been produced by combining, every 10 days, the output of an ocean
model forced by atmospheric reanalysis fluxes and quality controlled ocean
Accelerated Global Warming
As illustrated in Figure 1 above, the study divides ocean warming into three
layers for comparison – the uppermost 300 meters (grey), 700 meters (blue), and
the full ocean depth (violet). After each of the Mt. Agung, Chichón, and
Pinatubo volcanic eruptions (which cause short-term cooling by blocking
sunlight), a distinct ocean cooling event is observed in the data.
Additionally, after the very strong El Niño event of 1998, a cooling of the
upper 300 and 700 meters of oceans is visible as a result of heat being
transfered from the surface ocean to the atmosphere.
One of the clearest features in Figure 1 is the rapid warming of the oceans over
the past decade. As we have previously discussed, the warming of the shallower
oceans has slowed since around 2003, which certain climate contrarians have
cherrypicked to try and argue that global warming has slowed. However, more
heat accumulated in the deeper oceans below 700 meters during this period. The
authors describe the ocean warming since 1999 as,
“the most sustained warming trend in this record of OHC. Indeed, recent warming
rates of the waters below 700m appear to be unprecedented.”
Their results in this respect are very similar the main conclusion of Nuccitelli
et al. (2012), in which we noted that recently, warming of the oceans below 700
meters accounts for about 30% of overall ocean and global warming. Likewise,
this new study concludes,
“In the last decade, about 30% of the warming has occurred below 700 m,
contributing significantly to an acceleration of the warming trend.”
The warming of the oceans below 700 meters has also been identified by Levitus
et al. (2012) and Von Schuckmann & Le Traon (2011), for example.
Some ‘Missing Heat’ Found
Kevin Trenberth’s past comments about ‘missing heat’ drew considerable
attention. The phrase refers to the fact that the heat accumulation on Earth
since about 2004 (e.g. from warming oceans, air, and land, and melting ice) that
instruments were able to measure could not account for the amount of global heat
accumulation we expected to see, based on the energy imbalance caused by the
increased greenhouse effect, as measured by satellites at the top of the Earth’s
These new estimates of deeper ocean heat content go a long way towards resolving
that ‘missing heat’ mystery. There is still some discrepancy remaining, which
could be due to errors in the satellite measurements, the ocean heat content
measurements, or both. But the discrepancy is now significantly smaller, and
will be addressed in further detail in a follow-up paper by these scientists.
So what’s causing this transfer of heat to the deeper ocean layers? The authors
suggest that it is a result of changes in winds related to the negative phase of
the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and more frequent La Niña events.
Good News for Climate Sensitivity? Probably Not
Recently there have been some studies and comments by a few climate scientists
that based on the slowed global surface warming over the past decade, estimates
of the Earth’s overall equilibrium climate sensitivity (the total amount of
global surface warming in response to the increased greenhouse effect from a
doubling of atmospheric CO2, including amplifying and dampening feedbacks) may
be a bit too high. However, as we previously discussed, these studies and
comments tend to neglect the warming of the deep oceans below 700 meters.
Does the warming of the deep ocean support these arguments for lower equilibrium
climate sensitivity? Probably not, as Trenberth explained (via personal
“it contributes to the overall warming of the deep ocean that has to occur for
the system to equilibrate. It speeds that process up. It means less short term
warming at the surface but at the expense of a greater earlier long-term
warming, and faster sea level rise.”
So the slowed warming at the surface is only temporary, and consistent with the
‘hiatus decades’ described by Meehl et al. (2011). The global warming end
result will be the same, but the pattern of surface warming over time may be
different than we expect.
The real problem is that in the meantime, we have allowed the temporarily slowed
surface warming to lull us into a false sense of security, with many people
wrongly believing global warming has paused when in reality it has accelerated.
Global Warming Wake Up Call
Perhaps the most important result of this paper is the confirmation that while
many people wrongly believe global warming has stalled over the past 10–15
years, in reality that period is “the most sustained warming trend” in the past
half century. Global warming has not paused, it has accelerated.
The paper is also a significant step in resolving the ‘missing heat’ issue, and
is a good illustration why arguments for somewhat lower climate sensitivity are
fundamentally flawed if they fail to account for the warming of the oceans below
Most importantly, everybody (climate scientists and contrarians included) must
learn to stop equating surface and shallow ocean warming with global warming.
In fact, as Roger Pielke Sr. has pointed out, “ocean heat content change [is]
the most appropriate metric to diagnose global warming.” While he has focused
on the shallow oceans, actually we need to measure global warming by accounting
for all changes in global heat content, including the deeper oceans. Otherwise
we can easily fool ourselves into underestimating the danger of the climate
problem we face.
Last month, the standard-bearer for those arguing the U.S. will soon be awash in domestically produced oil testified before the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Daniel Yergin, Chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, told Members of Congress in his prepared remarks, “Owing to the scale and impact of shale gas and tight oil, it is appropriate to describe their development as the most important energy innovation so far of the 21st century” and “the unconventional oil and gas revolution has already had major impact in multiple dimensions. Its significance will continue to grow as it continues to unfold.”
Yet the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and independent analysis confirm that far from the “energy revolution” of the century, the increase in domestic oil production represents a temporary bump in production that will be short-lived. If we recognize the probability the impressive increases we’ve seen in shale gas and “tight oil” production are of limited volume and duration and set policies accordingly, we can reap great benefit; pretend these increases herald a new and ever-increasing permanent condition and we risk setting ourselves up for an avoidable economic contraction when the expected drop in production occurs. Geologist David Hughes, a 32-year veteran of the Geological Survey of Canada, recently conducted a detailed examination of the years-long performance of 65,000 shale gas and tight oil wells. The results were telling.
In the February 21 issue of Nature Magazine, Mr. Hughes reported that “much of the oil and gas produced [in shale formations] comes from relatively small sweet spots within the fields. Overall well quality will decline as sweet spots become saturated with wells, requiring and ever-increasing number of wells to sustain production.” More ominously, he notes, “high-productivity shale plays are not ubiquitous, as some would have us believe. Six out of 30 plays account for 88% of shale-gas production, and two out of 21 plays account for 81% of tight-oil production.” Even the typically optimistic EIA echoed the concerns about sweet spots and the likelihood high levels of production cannot be sustained.
In a little-noted press release last December, the EIA projected there would be a considerable increase in tight oil production in the next few years, but then conceded, “The growth results largely from a significant increase in onshore crude oil production, particularly from shale and other tight formations. After about 2020, production begins declining…” But as Mr. Hughes points out, evidence is growing that the production is not likely to rise as high as hoped, and his analysis indicates the drop in production could begin by 2017.
In late February, the EIA reported that “Saudi Aramco’s CEO Khalid al-Falih warned that rising domestic energy consumption could result in the loss of 3 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of crude oil exports by the end of the decade if no changes were made to current trends.” The New York Times reported that Chinese consumption by 2020 could be almost two-thirds greater than it was in 2011, resulting in a 6 million barrels per day (mbd) increase. Thus, viewed in context evidence indicates that U.S. domestic oil production could max out as early as 2017 and then begin a slow decline — just as Saudi Arabia could be exporting 3 mbd less and China could be needing 6 mbd more. The consequences to the U.S. economy of such a confluence could be drastic.
The idea of oil “independence” understandably appeals to Americans. It is likewise understandable that individuals and groups who have a financial interest in the American oil industry would argue and lobby for the investment in the means of producing energy for the U.S. that would most benefit them. But at some point America’s leaders must recognize the physical evidence indicates the alleged “energy revolution” is likely to be merely a relatively short-term bump. If we fail to acknowledge the likely realities, we may be setting the stage for an energy crisis in the near term that might have been minimized. The consequences of such a failure are difficult to predict, but given the already weakened health of the U.S. economy, they would likely be severe and long-lasting.
Daniel L. Davis is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army and a member of ASPO-USA’s Advisory Board. He has served combat duty in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. He was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor in 1991. He is a frequent contributor and commentator on energy and national security issues, and has been published in the Washington Times, International Herald Tribune, European Stars and Stripes, Defense News, Armed Forces Journal, Army Times, Air Force Times, and other publications.
What’s Happening with Oil Production in Other Major Producing States?
Alaskan Oil Production
Alaskan oil production peaked in 1988 at 2.1 mb/d. In 2012 it will average approximately 0.5 mb/d.
Prudhoe Bay Field Oil Production
The Prudhoe Bay field is the largest field ever discovered in the U.S. In 1988 it produced 1.56 mb/d. In 2012 it will produce ~0.30 mb/d. It will ultimately produce ~12.3 Gb. Through 2011 it had produced ~11.8 mb/d.
The Saga of the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
The NPR-A had an Estimated Ultimate Recover (EUR) of 9.5 billion barrels (Gb) based upon an assessment by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The Clinton and Bush administrations opened most of the NPR-A to oil and gas development. After years of exploration, approximately 0.3 Gb of oil has been discovered and production from the NPR-A has not even reversed the decline in Alaskan oil production. USGS oil reserves estimates have historically significantly overestimated recoverable reserves.
The USGS has assessed the Arctic National Wildlife refuge as having 10.5 Gb.
An Optimistic Oil Production Profile for the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
The USGS has assessed ANWR as having 10.5 billion barrels of oil as an average estimate. I view that as unrealistic. The graph above is what I consider to be a best-case production senario. Realistically I expect something less, probably considerably less.
Louisiana Oil Production
Louisiana’s oil production actually peaked in 1971 at 2.56 mb/d, Now it’s producing approximately 0.19 mb/d, 7.42% of the peak production level.
(This is a commentary I just wrote for the ASPO-USA newsletter)
A lot has been made in the media about how rapidly oil production is increasing in North Dakota due to development of tight oil in the Bakken Shale region of the state. Less has been made of the rapidly increasing oil production in Texas.
According to United States Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration (US DOE/EIA) data, oil production is rising faster in Texas than it is in North Dakota: a 523,000 b/d increase for Texas versus a 243,000 b/d increase for North Dakota in 2012, relative to 2011, based upon US DOE/EIA data as of 2/28/13.
In Texas, most of the recent oil production increase has come from a shale formation called Eagle Ford. Figure 1 is a diagram showing where Eagle Ford is located within Texas.
Eagle Ford Shale Formation Shown in Green
Eagle Ford actually has separate regions that produce dry gas, condensate and crude oil. Crude oil is produced on the north side of the formation, condensate in the middle and dry gas on the south side. Table I contains crude oil and condensate production data for Eagle Ford.
Eagle Ford Crude Oil and Condensate Production
|Year||Crude Oil Production (b/d)||Condensate Production (b/d)||Sum of Crude Oil + Condensate Production (b/d)||Change in Production from Previous Year (b/d)|
*Data from the Texas Railroad Commission as of 2/28/13
Among the interesting aspects of the data in Table I is the rapid rise of crude oil production in the last few years and the small increase for condensate production in 2012 relative to 2011. Is condensate production on the verge of declining? Time will time.
Table II illustrates, when compared to Table I, that most of the Texas oil (crude oil + condensate) production increase in the last few years has come from Eagle Ford.
Texas Oil Production Minus Eagle Ford
|Year||Texas – Eagle Ford Crude Oil + Condensate Production (b/d)||Change in Production (b/d)|
|2008-2012 Production Change||98,968|
*Data from the Texas Railroad Commission as of 2/28/13
The data in Tables I and II show that the oil production increase for Eagle Ford was over 4 times that of Texas outside of Eagle Ford between 2008 and 2012.
An interesting aspect of oil production data for Texas is that there is a wide discrepancy between the data from the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) and that from the US DOE/EIA over the last few years, illustrated in Table III. The oil production data in Table III is as of 2/28/13 for both agencies.
Texas Oil Production Data from the US DOE/EIA and TRC
|Year||US DOE/EIA Texas Oil Production Data (mb/d)||TRC Data (mb/d)||Difference between US DOE/EIA Data and TRC Data (b/d)|
I’ve highlighted the US DOE/EIA’s production figures for 2011 and 2012 in Table III because the difference between the two numbers corresponds to 523,000 b/d, a number given in the second paragraph of this commentary for the 2012 production increase in Texas based upon US DOE/EIA data. By comparison, the increase based upon TRC data is 221,000 b/d, the difference between the highlighted values for TRC data in Table III.
I first recognized a discrepancy between US DOE/EIA and TRC data in early 2012. At the time, I attempted to contact both the US DOE/EIA and TRC to try and determine the source of the discrepancy. I was informed by a representative of the TRC that they send their data to the US DOE/EIA but he wasn’t sure why their posted production figures differed from those of the US DOE/EIA. I received no response from the US DOE/EIA.
I intend to monitor revisions in production data from the two agencies over the next few years to determine the magnitude of the revisions from the two agencies over time.
I have specifically included the date on which I recorded data because revisions can be made without it being obvious that changes were made.
An important question to ask, relative to Texas oil production, is when will production peak for Eagle Ford? To answer that question, it requires a reasonable estimate of the amount of economically recoverable oil in Eagle Ford.
Based upon claims by oil industry promoters, there is some huge quantity of oil in Eagle Ford, as well as other shale formations, and a peak would occur in the distant future. Oil industry promoters like to exaggerate, I suppose to lure gullible investors, so I don’t place any stock in their estimates.
Based upon a recent assessment by the US DOE/EIA, the technically recoverable amount of oil in the Eagle Ford formation is approximately 3.3 billion barrels (Gb). Since the technically recoverable amount assumes that there is no limit on the amount of money that can be spent on recovery, I don’t place a lot of stock in that value as being what will be economically recoverable.
But let’s assume 3.3 Gb is a reasonable estimate for the economically recoverable amount of oil in Eagle Ford. Figure II is a graph of Eagle Ford oil production with an Estimated Ultimate Recovery of 3.3 Gb and a 6% decline rate after peak.
Based upon Figure II, peak production occurs in 2014. Of course the oil industry could choose to produce the oil more rapidly with a higher peak and a more rapid decline after the peak which would alter the peak date a little.
If the ultimate recovery is lower than 3.3 Gb, as I expect, the peak will likely be lower than ~600,000 b/d and the decline steeper.
If Figure II is a reasonably accurate assessment of future Eagle Ford oil production, a secondary peak in Texas oil production should occur around 2014 followed by declining production. To place current Texas oil production in perspective, peak production for Texas occurred in 1972 at 3.57 mb/d. Texas will never again reach a production level remotely close to that value.
As with Bakken, Eagle Ford oil production will be merely a bubble. Unfortunately, I wouldn’t expect the media to inform the public about the bubble until after the bubble has burst.
January data for Bakken and North Dakota came out yesterday. Below are graphs associated with Bakken and North Dakota oil production:
Bakken Oil Production
Bakken oil production declined about 31,000 b/d in January relative to December 2012. Production in January was 673,015 b/d.
North Dakota Oil Production
North Dakota’s oil production declined in parallel with Bakken oil production. Production in January was 738,022 b/d.
Number of Bakken Oil Wells
The number of Bakken oil wells surpassed 5000 in December and was 5157 at the end of January.
US DOE/EIA Projections are Popular
Media , politicians and the public like US DOE/EIA projections because their projections are optimistic. Unfortunately they are frequently highly inaccurate on the high side.
There are also concerns about the accuracy of monthly US DOE/EIA oil production data which I’ll get into later.
Increasing U.S. Oil Production
Oil production in the U.S. has been increasing in recent years due to two key shale formations: Bakken and Eagle Ford, which produce tight oil by hydraulic fracturing of the shale.
Tight oil is oil that is trapped in pore spaces or small fissures in rock (shale) that prevents the oil from flowing. Hydraulic fracturing breaks up the rock to allow the oil to flow. Tight oil production requires an oil price of ~$80/barrel or higher. It’s an energy intensive process and would not be done if oil companies had alternative sources of oil.
Bakken and Eagle Ford
Almost all of the new oil production in the U.S. is coming from North Dakota and Texas.
All of the new production from N.D. is coming from the Bakken region of N.D., the western side of the state. N.D. oil production outside of this area is declining.
Almost all of the new production in Texas is coming from a shale formation called Eagle Ford.
How Did the US DOE/EIA and I Do in Our Projections of Deepwater GOM Oil Production in the early 2000s?
Below are 2003 oil production projections from the US DOE/EIA and I for deepwater GOM oil production.
US DOE/EIA Projection
U.S. 48 States Offshore Oil Production- AEO-2010 Versus Actual
|Year||AEO2010 Production Projection (mb/d)||Actual Production (mb/d)|
*Data from the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. The EIA value is 1.27 mb/d.
Most of the offshore oil production for the Lower 48 States now comes from the deepwater GOM. When deepwater GOM oil production declines, total offshore production declines as seen in the table above.
Historical and Projected Oil Production from
The Shallow-Water Gulf of Mexico
Oil production from the shallow-water Gulf of Mexico reached its highest level in the early 1970s at a bit over 1.0 mb/d. It’s probably well under 300,000 b/d now.
How Did The US DOE/EIA and I do in our Projections of North Sea Oil Production in the Late 1990s?
|Peak Year||Peak Production (mb/d)||2010 Production (mb/d)||%Error Relative to Actual Values for 2010 Projections|
|US DOE/EIA’s Projections|
I’m finishing up a PowerPoint presentation with the title above. I’ll put most, if not all of the presentation here over the next week or so.
Here is a little about Mexican oil production and a little prelude:
Who Do I Think I Am Giving a Presentation About Oil?
I’ve been studying oil supply seriously since the 1980s. I like to compare my oil production projections with those of the U.S. Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration (US DOE/EIA).
How Did the US DOE/EIA and I Do in Our Projections of Mexican Oil Production in the early 2000s?
In their International Energy Outlook 2003 (IEO2003), the US DOE/EIA stated:
“Mexico is expected to adopt energy policies that will encourage the efficient development of its resource base. Expected production volumes in Mexico exceed 4.2 million barrels per day by the end of the decade and remain near that level through 2025.”
In my 2005 book, “The Future of Global Oil Production,” I stated:
”Declining production from the Cantarell complex will strongly influence Mexico’s future oil production since Cantarell produces such a large percentage of Mexico’s oil (~66% in 2004). If production from the Cantarell complex starts declining in 2006, [as I predict], it’s realistic to expect Mexico’s oil production to decline as well. The situation would be comparable to Alaska when the Prudhoe Bay field started declining. The Ku-Zaap-Maloob development, and possibly others, will slow the decline of Mexican oil production but it’s unrealistic to assume, as the US DOE/EIA does, that production can increase until 2010 and remain near that level through 2025.”
Cantarell Production and Decline Rates
|Year||Production Rate (mb/d)||Absolute Decline (b/d)||% Decline|
|2004-2010 Production Decline||1,590,000||74.30|